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Competition, Regulation, and the 
Role of Local Government Policies 
in Swedish Markets
Stefan Fölster and Sam Peltzman
8.1    Introduction
In a previous analysis of competition in Sweden (Fölster and Peltzman 
1997), we concluded that Sweden’s high price levels and low productivity 
growth in the 1970s and 1980s partly could be explained by a history of 
lax competition policy and a shortfall of new entry into many markets. 
Since then, a number of markets have been at least partially deregulated. 
For most goods, there is now intense competition from imports. Imports 
have increased from 29 to 48 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) 
over the period from 1990 to 2005. While this largely may be an eﬀect of 
globalization, changes in competition policy and deregulation have prob-
ably contributed. Competition policy has now been strengthened in line 
with EU policy.
In this chapter, we begin by describing the dramatic changes in competi-
tion policy, the deregulations that have been implemented, and the eﬀects 
that have been found in various studies. To broaden the perspective, we relate 
the Swedish experience to developments in other European countries, in 
general, and in the United States, in particular. Our survey suggests that by 
and large, the Swedish policy changes have been successful. Prices are lower 
and/ or productivity has improved in deregulated industries. Also, the aggre-
gate productivity growth has picked up, and Swedish prices have converged 
to those in other countries.
In one sector of the Swedish economy, however, competition is still 
the exception. Local government monopolies control a large share of the 
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economy, providing a wide array of social services, schools, health care, 
and local utilities. This may aﬀect prices and eﬃciency in these services. In 
addition, anticompetitive practices by local governments may inhibit the 
growth of local business and thus have wider consequences for local eco-
nomic development. The second part of the chapter is an empirical anal-
ysis of how local government intervention aﬀects income and employment. 
The analysis makes use of panel data for 290 local municipalities to exam-
ine how political economy variables such as unfair competition, cumber-
some bureaucracy, small share of private competition, and high tax rates 
aﬀect economic performance. The relationships are descriptive rather than 
causal, but the consistent pattern suggests that much more attention should 
be paid to local government policies in any analysis of Swedish economic 
performance.
8.1.1      Productivity Growth Has Picked Up
Many countries have deregulated markets in recent decades. Swedish 
markets initially were regulated more than most, but around 1990, Sweden 
embarked on a more ambitious policy of deregulation than many other 
countries. At the macrolevel, these policies appear to have been successful. 
Since the deregulation began, Sweden’s productivity growth has increased 
relative to both the European Union and the United States. Of course, how 
much of this improvement can be ascribed to deregulation is an open ques-
tion. Several other factors have undoubtedly contributed, among them 
being better macroeconomic policies and technological improvements, espe-
cially in the telecommunications industry, which is relatively important in 
Sweden.
8.1.2      Prices Not as High as They Were
In 1990, Sweden’s overall price level was among the highest in the devel-
oped world. This is no longer the case. High-  income countries tend to have 
higher price levels, but Sweden’s 1990 price level was roughly 40 percent 
higher than would have been expected, given Sweden’s level of GDP per 
capita. In 1992, Sweden abandoned its ﬁ  xed exchange rate regime, and the 
krona was allowed to ﬂ  oat. After a sizable depreciation, Sweden moved to 
roughly 20 percent above the value motivated by its per capita GDP and has 
since inched down to about 15 percent above that value.
Accordingly, while the combination of macro-   and regulatory policies 
may have reduced Sweden’s high price level, Sweden remains a relatively 
expensive country. The remaining price gap between Sweden and the Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average is 
probably due to many causes. The Swedish Competition Authority1 con-
cluded that about half of the diﬀerence between Swedish and OECD price 
1. For example, in Konkurrensverket (2000).Competition, Regulation, and the Role of Local Government Policies    2 5 5
levels can be explained by population size, GDP per capita, tax levels, labor 
costs, consumption patterns, and exchange rates. They surmised but did not 
present evidence that part of the unexplained diﬀerence might reﬂ  ect a lack 
of competition.
8.1.3      Competition Policy Has Been Sharpened
Sweden’s competition policy was extensively revised in the 1990s. In earlier 
decades, this policy had been extremely lax. Until 1993, cartel agreements 
were legal. Firms were free to enter agreements on price ﬁ  xing, sharing of 
markets, and allocation of retail outlets among manufacturers. Only resale 
price maintenance agreements and joint tendering on public contracts were 
prohibited. Around 1990, there were over one thousand cartel agreements 
registered, aﬀecting about 15 percent of total sales of goods and services.2
In our previous analysis of the Swedish manufacturing sector over the 
period from 1976 to 1990, we found that cartels had a substantial negative 
eﬀect on output, but it was hard to ﬁ  nd a corresponding eﬀect on prices once 
the eﬀect of regulation was accounted for.3
In 1993, Sweden’s law on competition was brought in line with rules of 
the European Community. Cartel agreements and other forms of horizontal 
price ﬁ  xing and market- sharing agreements became illegal per se. Fines were 
increased considerably. In 1995, Sweden joined the European Union.
The state of competition did not change immediately. Previous legal 
arrangements continued as informal arrangements in some cases. A num-
ber of cartels of this sort have been uncovered by the competition authority 
in recent years. Furthermore, it is unclear how eﬀective competition policy 
has been, or for that matter, can be. An analysis of U.S. antitrust policy 
reveals that there is little evidence that antitrust policy has actually had much 
eﬀect on consumer welfare. The reason is that market changes have worked 
faster against anticompetitive practices than antitrust policy (Crandall and 
Winston 2003).
8.1.4      Increased Competition in Retail Trade
Entry has become easier in a number of areas, from ﬁ  nancial services to 
retail stores and chimney sweepers. In retail trade apart from food, foreign 
chains have entered on a large scale and in many cases now hold consider-
able market shares.
Our previous analysis showed that the food sector was an especially 
important example of the price-  increasing eﬀects of regulation. Prior to 
1992, protection against imports was even greater than in the European 
Union. Entry at the food retail level was also subject to municipal zon-
ing regulation, which was often used to protect the biggest chains. These 
2. SPK (1992).
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laws remain in place today. However, many municipalities have adopted 
less restrictive regulation, which has led to a gradually increasing market 
share for low-  price stores and to some entry by new food-  store chains 
and foreign chains. The Swedish Competition Authority found that in the 
period from 1997 to 2000, municipalities with a restrictive implementation 
of zoning regulation had less food stores per inhabitant and that a more 
liberal regulation appeared to lower food prices.4 Reduced import protec-
tion in combination with increased competition in food retailing appears 
to have had a measurable impact on prices. From 1991, when the reforms 
began, to 2003, consumer prices for food increased only 5 percent, com-
pared to an increase of more than 30 percent in the overall Consumer Price 
Index.
8.1.5      Natural Monopolies Have Been Deregulated
Many of the traditional natural monopolies have been deregulated rather 
more in Sweden than the European average, and in some cases, the United 
States. Comparisons made by the European Union show that all European 
countries have opened their aviation and telecommunications markets. Most 
countries, but not Sweden, still retain a partial monopoly for postal services 
(letters). About half of the European countries have not yet opened their 
electricity markets to competition. Taxi regulation prevents entry in many 
countries, but not in Sweden (Bekken 2003). And railways seem to be more 
liberalized in Sweden than in most European countries.
Nevertheless, there remain quite a number of unresolved regulatory issues 
in all these markets. We will give a brief account of how Sweden has tried 
to tackle these issues and of what the outcome has been. Comparisons 
with the U.S. experience of deregulation, which often predated Sweden’s, 
provide supplementary evidence and sometimes suggest lessons for both 
countries.
Electricity
The electricity market was previously vertically integrated. The large pro-
ducers regulated the market in various clubs under the chairmanship of the 
dominant state-  owned Vattenfall. After deregulation in 1996, the market 
has been divided into three segments: generating, distributing, and trading 
ﬁ  rms. Only distribution ﬁ  rms are now regulated monopolies. In addition, 
the Nordic market has opened up so that the export and import of electric-
ity have become easier. It is quite common now for trading ﬁ  rms to sell 
imported electricity directly to households. Consumers are billed separately 
by the distribution ﬁ  rm.
One concern in the wake of deregulation has been that the larger groups 
have bought up small and medium-  sized networking and trading ﬁ  rms. 
4. Lundvall and Odlander (2001).Competition, Regulation, and the Role of Local Government Policies    2 5 7
State-  owned Vattenfall remains a dominant actor, which increasingly has 
invested in other countries as well. A recent investigation by the Regulatory 
Reform Commission also claims that the supervising Energy Agency needs 
to be strengthened and given more independence.
Electricity prices are lower in Sweden than in many other European 
countries. In one study of the eﬀects of deregulation on prices, Green and 
Damsgaard (2005) show that costs and prices are lower than they would 
have been without deregulation. The largest gains, due to cost savings, have 
accrued to the electricity-  producing companies and industrial customers. 
Households, after an initial period of lower prices, have ended up paying 
higher prices. This may be due to environmental taxes, increasing demand, 
and integration of the Swedish electricity market with pricier markets in 
neighboring countries.
The vertical separation of generation from distribution in Sweden paral-
lels developments in other countries such as the United Kingdom. In the 
United States, the trend toward vertical separation has been slowed consid-
erably in the aftermath of a poorly designed restructuring in California and 
the scandalous collapse of Enron, which had been a major participant in 
the California wholesale market. The well-  publicized supply shortfalls and 
price increases in California and the association of regulatory restructuring 
with a major corporate scandal have made further restructuring politically 
impossible for the time being. However, a gradual trend toward vertical sepa-
ration continues. In retrospect, it is clear that California’s experiment failed 
because of poor regulatory design—the uncertainty induced by the long 
delay between the decision to restructure and implementation of changes, 
the slavish devotion to spot markets at wholesale, and the frozen retail rates. 
Nevertheless, the experience has slowed moves toward further market liber-
alization elsewhere in the United States.
Aviation
Aviation has been deregulated in the same way as in most European 
countries and in the United States. The market is still dominated by Scan-
dinavian Airlines System (SAS), which is partly state owned. A consider-
able number of entrants have come into the market, and some have left 
again. Proﬁ  t levels are generally low. Most airports are state owned and are 
not exposed to competition. There are complaints of how they charge fees 
for their services and allocate slot times. Fees have increased considerably 
since 1993.
Prices have risen more than the Consumer Price Index since deregulation. 
But an international comparison seems to indicate that Sweden has about 
the same price level as many European countries for business tickets but 
lower prices for private tickets (Luftfartsverket 2004).
In the United States, domestic aviation has been deregulated since 
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new entrants have tried to attract passengers with low fares, and this has 
put pressure on the established carriers. The result has been inconsistent 
proﬁ  tability for the carriers but substantially lower prices for most con-
sumers. For example, the industry’s average yield (revenues per passenger 
kilometer) has declined by 55 percent in real terms since 1977. As in Sweden, 
the airports and airways are government monopolies, and their slot alloca-
tion and overall management policies have begun to constrain the industry’s 
further growth.
Railways
Previously, the Swedish State Railways (SJ) had a monopoly. Since 1988, 
it has been merely a carrier, while the National Rail Administration operates 
the network. For goods, traﬃc entry is free, but for passenger traﬃc, SJ still 
has a monopoly on proﬁ  table traﬃc. Nonproﬁ  table interregional and local 
traﬃc is procured by various authorities, often in a competitive tendering 
procedure.
In the railway market, prices fell for the transport of goods but increased 
for passenger traﬃc, in particular for nonsubsidized traﬃc. This partly is 
explained by new high-  speed trains that were taken into operation. The 
subsidized traﬃc was often put out to tender and has seen smaller price 
increases. Some of the price increases are explained by the fact that the 
degree of subsidization has been reduced from 64 percent in 1990 to 42 per-
cent in 2002. One study concludes that the most important competition to 
railways has come from long- distance bus traﬃc, which was also liberalized 
during the 1990s.5
The United States deregulated railway freight transportation in 1980. 
The industry has since consolidated from over one hundred ﬁ  rms into six 
major ﬁ  rms. Productivity has increased much faster than the economy- wide 
average, and prices have fallen considerably. For example, the cost per ton 
kilometer of freight has fallen 50 percent in real terms since 1980.
Postal Services
The state-  owned postal service, Posten AB, has been exposed to intense 
competition in ﬁ  nancial services and package delivery. At the heart of the 
monopoly, however, was letter delivery. Unlike the United States, this has 
been opened to competition, and up to one hundred ﬁ  rms entered. Only one 
ﬁ  rm, however, has been able to establish a large-  scale operation. London 
Economics (2003) ﬁ  nds that Sweden has an average price level comparable 
to other European countries. Most European countries have also deregu-
lated ﬁ  nancial services and package delivery but retain a state monopoly 
in letter delivery. Swedish prices are considerably lower than still-  regulated 
Norwegian prices.
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Telecommunications
Starting in 1993, the market gradually has been opened to more players 
than the former monopolist, the partly state-  owned TeliaSonera. TeliaSon-
era also operates most of the ﬁ  xed nationwide network, but it is required to 
allow access to other ﬁ  rms at regulated prices. Mobile services are provided 
by a number of competitors that operate their own network.
In the telecommunications market, an OECD comparison indicates that 
prices are relatively low in Sweden compared to other European coun-
tries.6
The United States began restructuring the telecommunications industry 
in the 1980s, when the traditional land- line long- distance market was opened 
to competition and deregulated. Prices, especially in long distance, have 
fallen considerably.
Other Markets
Apart from the network services, there have been a number of other 
deregulations. One example is taxis. Before deregulation, entry and prices 
were regulated, as they are in every sizeable U.S. city, except Washington, 
DC. There were often queues for taxis. After deregulation, the number of 
taxi companies and drivers increased considerably, but prices also increased. 
Burdett and Fölster (1994) analyze the eﬀects of taxi deregulation and con-
clude that the decrease in waiting times of an average of four minutes per trip 
was well worth the price increase, given taxi customers estimated valuation 
of waiting time. More recently, Bekken (2003) shows that Stockholm has 
relatively low taxi prices compared to other European capitals.
8.1.6      Assessing the Overall Eﬀects of Deregulation
A recent government investigation team, the Regulatory Reform Com-
mission (2005), has attempted to evaluate the eﬀects of deregulation in 
telecommunications, electricity, postal, domestic aviation, taxi, and railway 
markets. Their conclusion is that the number of ﬁ  rms has increased in all of 
the deregulated markets. Productivity has increased faster after deregulation 
in at least four of the six markets.7 A sign of this also is that employment has 
decreased in all markets, except for the taxi market.
When it comes to price changes, the commission notes that prices after 
deregulation have increased relative to the Consumer Price Index in ﬁ  ve 
of the six markets. The only exception is the telecommunications market, 
where prices have fallen substantially. From this, the commission infers that 
6. OECD (2003).
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deregulation has not had the eﬀect of lowering prices. This is not a valid 
inference, however, because the relevant question is whether prices are 
lower than they would have been in the absence of deregulation. The stud-
ies referred to in the previous section suggest that they may be, as Sweden 
has relatively low prices in deregulated network markets. One explanation 
for these diverging conclusions is that many of the network markets have 
been subject to industry-  speciﬁ  c cost increases. Electricity and aviation, for 
example, have been burdened with various environmental taxes. Railroads 
have had to pay higher electricity prices. Furthermore, prices in network 
markets have not increased faster than domestic services, in general. This 
may be a more relevant comparison than the Consumer Price Index, which 
is aﬀected by falling prices for imported goods. Another aspect, however, is 
that competition in network markets, even after deregulation, remains far 
from perfect. Therefore, prices in network markets hardly can be expected 
to follow the same pattern as in consumer markets, where competition is 
unfettered. On average, consumer prices have increased 1.2 percent per 
year over the period from 1994 to 2004. The partially deregulated net-
work industries previously reviewed have seen price increases of 3 per-
cent a year during this period. Finally, completely regulated sectors such 
as health care and municipal services have seen price hikes of 6 percent 
a year.
It is possible to examine the relation between the degree of competition 
and the average annual price increases a bit more closely. In ﬁ  gure 8.1, eigh-
teen industries have been ranked in terms of a competition index that is 
based on the extent of product market regulation, new entry, and a number 
of other factors.8 There seems to be a surprisingly good correlation with 
average annual price increases. Bergman (2004) plots the unexplained (by 
diﬀerences in labor costs, wage tax wedges, and consumption taxes) price 
diﬀerences between Sweden and the European Union against our competi-
tion index and also ﬁ  nds a close correlation.
Even these correlations are quite crude, however, and we view them as 
merely suggestive.
While there is no similar data for the United States, the overall pattern 
is reasonably clear. All of the transportation industries that were deregu-
lated in the late 1970s—air, truck, and rail—experienced substantially lower 
prices. In telecommunications and electricity, which have been partly deregu-
lated, the picture is more mixed. The decline in telecommunications prices 
has been substantial, but part of this is due to technological advances rather 
than regulatory changes. The partial restructuring of electricity has had 
8. The competition index is based on eleven variables that are graded on a scale from one to 
ﬁ  ve for each branch. The variables are horizontal and vertical integration, import competition, 
rate of entry, industry concentration, regulation, share of private production, productivity 
growth, subsidies, existence of a black market, and the proﬁ  t margin. The variables are weighted 
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eﬀects similar to those in Sweden: declining prices for large users and little 
change for small users.
8.1.7    Pervasive  Local  Monopolies
The one area where monopolies are pervasive is in services provided by 
the local government sector. Local governments ﬁ  nance and are the main 
providers of health care, schools, child care, and care of the elderly. Competi-
tion in this sector is quite limited, although private provision has increased 
since 1990. Now, 9 percent of local public consumption is purchased from 
private providers, up from about 4 percent in 1990. In child care, 13 percent is 
produced by private providers; in elderly care, the ﬁ  gure is 12 percent; and in 
schools, it is 5 percent. School vouchers were introduced in 1991, and nearly 
6 percent of all pupils use them to attend nongovernment schools.
The gradual increase in competition for local government services has had 
some success. For example, costs for local bus services decreased consider-
ably in the early 1990s, as most municipalities began procuring these services 
in open tendering.9 In the United States, such public tendering remains the 
rare exception. Several studies indicate that voucher schools have had a 
positive eﬀect on academic achievement in surrounding municipal schools.10 
In the United States, there has been much discussion of school vouchers, 
but only a few scattered experiments have focused on poor households, and 
no strong conclusions about their eﬀects have emerged thus far. Education 
through high school remains essentially a public monopoly in the United 
Fig. 8.1    The competition index and the average annual price increase, 1994 to 2004
9. Alexanderson, Fölster, and Hultén (1998).
10. For example, Bergström and Sandström (2002, 2005).262        Stefan Fölster and Sam Peltzman
States, with 90 percent of students attending a public school usually tied to 
residence. The important competition in this system traditionally has come 
from the thousands of local school districts ﬁ  nanced mainly by taxes tied 
to local property values, which might be eroded by dissatisfaction with the 
schools as people move to districts with better schools. However, this inter-
jurisdictional competition has weakened. A greater proportion of school 
revenues now comes from outside the local school districts (states and the 
federal government), and recently, all school districts have come under sub-
stantially increased federal regulation.
8.1.8    Concluding  Remarks
A main theme in our 1997 study was that poor productivity growth and 
high prices in Sweden were related to the lack of competition in regulated 
industries. Developments since then are supportive of that theme. Although 
we cannot quantify the relationship between deregulation and increased 
competition on one hand and higher productivity growth and lower prices 
in the overall economy on the other, the evidence from microstudies sur-
veyed here suggests that these policy reforms have had a considerable eﬀect 
on productivity growth and prices. This largely mirrors the experience with 
similar deregulations in the United States that most often were implemented 
a few years ahead of those in Sweden. In both countries, there is scope for 
further competition and an improved regulatory framework—for example, 
in aviation and electricity markets.
The fact that Swedish industry has been exposed to more international 
competition and to much stricter competition law since the early 1990s 
undoubtedly also has contributed to improved productivity and lower 
prices. The lack of new entry remains a problem in many sectors, however. 
In our previous study, an important ﬁ  nding was that the lack of new entry 
was a greater barrier to competition than was industry concentration. At a 
macroeconomic level, Sweden still has relatively few people engaged in start-
ing new ﬁ  rms. Regardless of whether one compares the rate of start- ups, the 
share of self-  employed, the number of registered ﬁ  rms, or other measures 
of entrepreneurship, Sweden appears to have less entrepreneurial activity 
than the European Union and much less than the United States. (See, for 
example, Henrekson and Stenlund 2006). Even though it is impossible to 
know what the optimal rate of entry is, Sweden’s exceptionally low rate of 
entrepreneurial activity suggests that insuﬃcient entry may inhibit competi-
tion. It is therefore of interest to examine also how competition policy aﬀects 
new entry and establishment of new businesses, in general.
In the next section, we take a closer look at the competition problems 
in the local public sector. Speciﬁ  cally, we analyze the relationship between 
local government policies and the growth of local business, employment, 
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8.2      Local Government Policies and the Private Sector in Sweden
Local governments play an important role in Sweden’s public ﬁ  nances. 
Their expenditures amount to around 25 percent of GDP, and they also 
employ about a quarter of all Swedish workers. These are around double the 
comparable ﬁ  gures for the United States. Because of their large economic 
role, the tax, expenditure, and regulatory policies of these local governments 
can have important eﬀects on the private sector, and that connection is the 
subject of this section.
Sweden’s political system consists of twenty-  one counties (län), which 
are the rough equivalent of U.S. states in terms of political geography. Each 
county is divided into municipalities (kommun), which are similar to a com-
bination of U.S. counties and cities. There are 290 municipalities. Here, we 
focus on the municipalities, which account for around 80 percent of local 
government employment and 70 percent of expenditures. Our goal ﬁ  rst is 
to describe some aspects of the municipalities’ political economy that we 
can measure and then to explore the connection between those measures 
and the larger local economy. The analysis is in two parts. The ﬁ  rst uses a 
panel of municipalities in the 2001 to 2004 period. The second part focuses 
on growth over the last decade. The short panel has a greater variety of 
data than the longer cross section, but the latter covers perhaps the more 
interesting data.
8.2.1      The 2001 to 2004 Panel
This part of our analysis extensively uses the results of an annual survey 
conducted by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (SN) of approxi-
mately 37,000 Swedish business owners. The survey includes two questions 
about the government of the municipality in which the business operates: (a) 
what is your experience with unfair public competition from your municipal-
ity? and (b) what is your experience with bureaucracy and regulation in the 
municipality? The responses are on a one to six scale, where higher numbers 
mean a better experience. We have municipality averages of these responses 
for no fewer than 273 of the 290 municipalities for 2001 to 2004.
The questions principally are about diﬀerent aspects of a business owner’s 
relations with municipal government. The ﬁ  rst question reﬂ  ects the exten-
sive involvement of the government in local enterprises. Speciﬁ  cally, the 
290 municipalities operate a total of 1,400 ﬁ  rms, with combined revenues 
of about 130 billion SEK per year. Around half the revenues come from 
housing ﬁ  rms. Municipality- owned utilities are common, and many munici-
palities also operate hotels, restaurants, retail outlets, repair shops, or other 
kinds of businesses that are typically privately owned. This government 
activity raises a concern about constriction of the private sector, either 
through unfair methods of competition or through more general policies. 264        Stefan Fölster and Sam Peltzman
In a survey by the Swedish Competition Authority, two of three ﬁ  rm owners 
claimed to be exposed to competition from government services.11
In the SN survey that we use later, ﬁ  rm owners were also asked about the 
problems they encountered in competing with their municipality. The most 
commonly mentioned problems are as follows:
￿   Sales below costs. Municipal agencies frequently sell at marginal cost, 
because ﬁ  xed costs are already covered by tax revenue. For example, 
the municipal park administration frequently sells excess plants to the 
general public at low prices.
￿   Subsidies to some actors on the market. Municipal agencies provide sub-
sidies to municipal sport facilities or provide free labor in unemploy-
ment programs to municipal ﬁ  rms.
￿   Tendering. Competition between municipal and private companies is 
rigged in favor of the municipal ﬁ  rms.
￿   Conﬂ  ict of interest. An example is that a municipal agency that controls 
ﬁ  re-  security standards also sells consultancy services on ﬁ  re security.
At the state and county levels, there are also a large number of government 
agencies and state-   and county-  owned ﬁ  rms that aﬀect competition. In one 
survey of government agencies, one-  fourth of all agencies were found to be 
active producers in private markets (Bergdahl 2000). The government is thus 
both a competitor and a potential source of contracts for the private sector. 
In the context of the survey question, a private business person would give 
low marks to a municipality that favored or subsidized a government- owned 
competitor or foreclosed a market entirely to private supply.
The second question in the SN survey, which is about bureaucracy and 
regulation, would apply to all businesses, not just those facing government 
competition. We will soon see, however, that there is a large common ele-
ment—call it perceived business friendliness—in the answers to these two 
questions.
Swedish municipalities have been increasingly privatizing some activities. 
In the aggregate, the share of municipally ﬁ  nanced services that is provided 
by private contractors has increased from 4 percent to 9 percent since 1990. 
There are, however, large regional diﬀerences. In Stockholm, about 20 per-
cent is purchased from private providers, and private contracting is extensive 
in the rest of the Stockholm region. However, in about half of all munici-
palities, the share is close to zero. We use the percentage of a municipality’s 
budget spent on private contracts as another indicator of the local political 
economy.
Finally, we use two broad measures: one political, the other ﬁ  scal. Politi-
cally, municipalities are governed by municipal councils. These have any-
where from 31 to 101 members, depending on population, and they are 
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elected every four years. The last election occurred in 2002, which is con-
veniently in the middle of the 2001 to 2004 period that we analyze. The 
allocation of seats among parties is determined by proportional representa-
tion. We use a simple right-  left summary of this allocation. The right-  wing 
share is based on the seats held by the four main right-  of-  center parties 
(Moderates, Center Party, Liberals, and Christian Democrats), while the 
left-  wing share is based on representation of the three main left parties 
(Greens, Social Democrats, and Left Party). Together, the seven main par-
ties hold 95 percent of the seats, but the minor parties can be important 
locally.12
Our ﬁ  scal measure is the local tax rate. Most revenue for county and munic-
ipality government is raised by a tax on individual income (after exemptions 
and deductions). The rates reﬂ  ect the division of spending between the two 
levels of government, with the municipality tax around twice the county 
tax. The combined local tax rate averages around 25 percent of unadjusted 
income and over 30 percent of taxable income.
Our goal is to see if local public policies plausibly aﬀect the size of the 
local economy, with particular reference to the private sector. For example, 
does a municipality’s private sector grow if it adopts policies that are friendly 
to the private sector? Does any private-  sector growth enlarge the overall 
economy, or does it just replace government activity? To answer such ques-
tions, we employ a variety of measures of the municipality’s macroeconomy. 
These include the following:
￿   Employment—total and private sector: these are for workplaces located 
within the municipality.
￿   Individual income and individual plus enterprise income: these are 
the amounts assessed for collection of local and national taxes. Indi-
vidual income approximates wage and salary payments in the national 
accounts. Each municipality taxes its own residents.13 Accordingly, one 
municipality is credited with income that may have been earned by its 
residents at a workplace in another municipality. The enterprise income 
principally is the capital income that is generated at workplaces in the 
municipality (and that is taxed at the national level).
￿    The private-  sector share of household income: the numerator is wages 
and beneﬁ  ts received from the private sector. The denominator adds to 
these wages and beneﬁ  ts from the public sector plus publicly ﬁ  nanced 
transfers.
￿   Private workplaces in the municipality: a workplace is similar to 
an establishment in U.S. data (i.e., the basic microunit for industry 
12. For example, there is neither a right nor left majority in around one-  sixth of the cities.
13. Municipalities are compensated by the state for diﬀerences in tax revenues, which are 
due to diﬀerences in the tax base and to demographic diﬀerences aﬀecting local public expen-
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analysis). Total private-  sector activity equals activity per workplace 
multiplied by the number of workplaces. Accordingly, an increased 
number of workplaces need not imply a larger private sector if there 
are many small new workplaces.
None of these measures directly captures activity in the unreported shadow 
economy. By some measures, this may comprise 5 to 15 percent of GDP. 
Accordingly, municipality policies that negatively aﬀect private business 
activity may be partly oﬀset by greater activity in the shadow economy.
Tables 8.1 through 8.3 provide some descriptive data and correlations. 
They are mainly self-  explanatory, but some highlights deserve mention. 
Table 8.1 shows the business community to be faint in its praise of the local 
public sector. The scores hover below the middle of the one to six range, and 
there is no discernible trend. By contrast, as mentioned previously, private 
contracting is growing rapidly, with the private share of municipal budgets 
having nearly doubled over the 1997 to 2003 period. Politically, municipali-
ties tilt slightly left. There was small but nontrivial party turnover in the 
2002 elections, which led to slightly more right- left polarization than before. 
Both tables 8.1 and 8.2 highlight again the importance of Sweden’s public 
sector: over half of household income in the average municipality comes 
from public-  sector employment or transfers.
Table 8.3 provides descriptive correlations (panel A) and regressions (panel 
B). The variables in the latter are chosen somewhat arbitrarily, and no causal 
inferences should be drawn from them (especially the between- municipality 
regressions in part 1 of panel B). Our goal here is to give the reader a sense 
of the important regularities (and nonregularities) in the makeup of the 
political economy of Swedish municipalities. Panel A, which is dominated 
by between- municipality eﬀects, shows that the municipalities most friendly 
to business (high survey scores, relatively low tax rates, high private- contract 
shares) tend to have relatively large private sectors and lean to the right 
politically. The between-  regressions in panel B suggest that both these fac-
tors (and where relevant, lower tax rates) contribute independently. The 
one wrinkle here is with private contracting. This has gone furthest in large, 
high-  income cities and in the Stockholm area, where the private-  contract 
share is over double the national average. Neither city size nor income nor 
location seems consistently related to the other indicators.
The within-  municipality regressions (panel B.2) conﬁ  rm some of the 
cross-  sectional patterns. So, a tilt to the right in the 2002 elections or an 
increase in tax rates tends to be associated with lower scores on the SN 
survey. However, these regressions are more interesting for what they do 
not show. For example, each includes among the regressors an estimate of 
the exogenous component of the size of the local economy. This is derived 
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the within-  sample period national trends in industry employment.14 That 
expected employment variable has no consistent relation to the political 
14. Speciﬁ  cally, we have a roughly one-  digit industry breakdown of employment by 
municipality. We take the 1999 composition as a base year. Then, we multiply the base-  year 
employment in each industry in each municipality by an index (1999  1.0) of total Swedish 
Table 8.1  Descriptive statistics: Political economy of Swedish municipalities, 2001 to 2004
   
Sample 




SD   Notes
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise survey
  Unfair  public  competition? 1,142 3.19 0.48 0.24 1
  (1   big problem, 6  no problem)
  2001 273 2.87 0.47 2
  2002 273 3.11 0.40 2
  2003 273 3.56 0.39 2
  2004 273 3.19 0.39 2
Quality of bureaucracy and regulation
  (1   bad, 6  excellent) 1,142 2.66 0.27 0.14 1
  2001 273 2.61 0.27 2
  2002 273 2.64 0.28 2
  2003 273 2.71 0.27 2
  2004 273 2.69 0.27 2
Municipal council seats, shares
  Right-  wing  parties 580 0.45 0.12 0.03 3
  Left-  wing  parties 580 0.50 0.11 0.03 3
2002 election transitions
  Right  majority  gained 18 4
  Right  majority  lost 12 4
  Left  majority  gained 20 4
  Left  majority  lost 15 4
Local tax rates (%) 5
  Total 1,158 31.32 1.13 0.42
  Municipality 1,158 21.25 1.32 0.21
  County 1,154 10.10 0.54 0.33
Private contracting (%) 6
  2001  to  2003 868 6.11 4.81 1.32
  2001 289 5.51 4.19
  2002 289 6.21 4.94
  2003 290 6.62 5.20
  1997   287   3.57  3.11       7
Notes: Subsequent regressions may use transformations of these variables. “Within SD” is the standard 
deviation within municipalities, across years, and net of year ﬁ  xed eﬀects. 1  sample includes munici-
palities with missing data for some years. 2  sample includes only municipalities with data in all years. 
3  share of seats in the 1998 and 2002 elections held by the main right-  wing parties (Moderates, Liber-
als, Christian Democrats, Center). 4  majority means that the coalition has over 50 percent of the seats. 
There are 580 potential transitions for the 290 councils in 2002. 5  local tax or left-  wing parties (Green, 
Social Democrats, Left). Other parties not classiﬁ  ed. 6  payments to private contractors as percent of 
municipality’s total expenditures. 7  shown for comparison only.268        Stefan Fölster and Sam Peltzman
economy variables. Thus, we can rule out, for example, that incipient good 
times become reﬂ  ected in business peoples’ praise for the local government 
or in a rightward tilt politically. Also, the last within- regression suggests that 
business perceptions of unfair competition do not move signiﬁ  cantly in the 
short run when the private sector receives more municipal contracts.
Finally, all of the correlations and regressions suggest that the two ele-
ments of the SN survey may be measuring much the same thing. The two 
are highly correlated across and within municipalities, and they share similar 
coeﬃcients in the between- regressions. Accordingly, we henceforth will work 
with an average of the two elements, which we chose to regard as an overall 
indicator of probusiness policies.
8.2.2      The Local Economy and Political Economy
Table 8.4 contains a more systematic look at the data. It shows results of 
within-   and between-  municipality regressions in which the dependent vari-
able is some economic outcome and in which one of the political economy 
variables is on the right- hand side. This procedure in eﬀect treats the political 
economy measures as alternative depictions of similar underlying local poli-
cies, a view which is roughly consistent with the data in table 8.3. We also 
include a couple of regressions with two of the political economy variables 
on the right-  hand side to indicate that nothing much hinges on our estima-
tion strategy. The within-  regressions are identiﬁ  ed from movements, net of 
ﬁ  xed-  year eﬀects, over three or four years within each of the 290 munici-
employment in that industry for each year. The result is an estimate of what total employment 
in the municipality would have been if employment in each of its industries had grown at the 
national average rate after 1999. This estimate is unaﬀected by any municipality policy change 
or political shift after 1999 (that diﬀers from the national average).
Table 8.2  Descriptive statistics: Economic variables, Swedish municipalities, 2001 to 2004




SD   Notes
Aggregate indicators (per capita)
    Personal income (SEK 000) 1,157 141.18 16.79 2.070 1
  Personal   enterprise income (SEK 000) 1,157 152.09 25.13 7.290 1
    Employment (2001 to 2003) 868 0.40 0.09 0.009 2
Private sector
    Share of household income (2001 to 2003) 868 0.49 0.08 0.007 3
    Share of employment (2001 to 2003) 869 0.62 0.08 0.015 4
    Private workplaces per 1,000   1,158   107.46  29.96   3.280    
Notes: Subsequent regressions may use transformations of these variables. “Within SD” is the standard 
deviation within municipalities, across years, and net of year ﬁ  xed eﬀects. 1  assessed income before 
deductions and exemptions for assessing local and national taxes. Local taxes are assessed only on per-
sonal income. 2  employment at workplaces located in the municipality. 3  household income from 
privately ﬁ  nanced wages and beneﬁ  ts/(private  public wages and beneﬁ  ts  public transfers). 4  em-
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palities. The between-  regressions are just cross-  municipality averages with 
added controls for municipality population and the Stockholm region.15 As 
expected, the within- results tend to be weaker, but the presumed direction of 
causality is perhaps a bit easier to swallow than for the between- regressions. 
15. In the Swedish context, this region is an outlier. Per capita income here is around 20 per-
cent above the sample average, as is the private share of household income and employment. 
We also tried dummies for Sweden’s far north, which lies at the other end of these distribu-
tions, but these never proved signiﬁ  cant. Table 8.4 does not show any of the results for these 
controls, because they are peripheral to our inquiry. In summary, larger municipalities, and of 
course the Stockholm region, have above-  average incomes, employment, and private-  income 
Table 8.3  Correlations and descriptive regressions: Political economy variables

















A Correlation coeﬃcients, political and economic variables
Municipal bureaucracy/regulation .61
Local tax rate –.23 –.27
Right-  wing seat share .37 .33 –.37
Private contract (%) .24 .13 –.46 .34
Personal income per capita .28 .14 –.31 .15 .66
Private- income  share .35 .35 –.55 .36 .49
Private- employment  share .34 .39 –.39 .33 .21
Private workplaces per capita .12 .01 .15 .33 –.08
Population (log) –.15 –.06 –.38 .06 .42
Stockholm region  1 .15 .05 –.36 .18 .69
B Descriptive regressions
1. Between-  municipalities coeﬃcients
1 Unfair public competition –.019a .369a
1 Municipal bureaucracy –.380
Local tax rate –.186 –.156 –.714
Right-  wing seat share 1.649 1,435 –.658a 7.559
Private contract (%) .015a –.001a –.061
Per capita income (log) .028a .099a .941a –.242 14.315
Private- income  share 3.842 4.370 –3.768 .706 –9.356
Population (log) –.390 –.222 –.271 –.002a .854
Stockholm region –.151a –.634 .109a .038a 7.459
Between R- square .53 .28 .48 .17 .69
Number of observations (municipalities) 851 (289) 851 (289) 851 (289) 578 (289) 851 (289)
2 2. Within-  municipalities coeﬃcients
3 Expected employment (log) –6.427a –.366a 10.054a
Unfair public competition .035a
4 Municipal bureaucracy and regulation .82
Local tax rate –.153 –.008 .385
Right- wing  share .169a 1.098a
Private contract (%) .003a
Within R- square .55 .07 .15
    Number of observations (municipalities)  1,142 (290)   851 (289)       578 (289)   851 (289)
Notes: 1  expressed as a standardized (0,1) variable. 2  all regressions include year and municipality dummies. Standard errors 
(not shown) are clustered by municipality. 3  predicted employment, given presample industry composition of municipality and 
national trends in industry- speciﬁ  c employment. See text. 4  ﬁ  rst column gives within- municipality correlation between “unfair 
public competition” and “municipal bureaucracy/regulation.” Subsequent results on this line and for the next column are for a 
standardized (0,1) average of the two standardized variables.
aCoeﬃcients have P- value   0.05. All others have P- values   0.05.270        Stefan Fölster and Sam Peltzman
All of the results need to be taken with some caution: undoubtedly, causality 
runs both ways, and these data are too crude to do much more than state 
Table 8.4  Local public policies and the local economy and private sector, 2001 to 2004












Coeﬃcient   t   Coeﬃcient   t   Coeﬃcient   t   Coeﬃcient   t
Total (per capita, logs)
Individual  enterprise income
1  Within .004 0.9 –.011 2.7 .001 1.1 .034 0.9
1  Between .022 3.1 –.024 4.0 .008 3.8 .059 1.2
 Within  (multi)a .003 0.6 –.013 3.3
 Between  (multi)a .015 2.0 –.017 2.5
2 Employment (net of expected)
 Within .004 1.7 .008 2.8 .002 2.1 –.062 1.2
 Between .013 4.0 –.008 3.5 .002 2.0 .103 5.2
Private-  sector shares of
3 Household income
 Within .002 2.3 –.002 2.2 –.0001 0.4 .024 1.6
 Between .042 10.8 –.032 9.2 .004 3.1 .194 6.2
 Within  (multi)a .002 2.0 –.002 2.5
 Between  (multi)a .033 7.6 –.016 4.4
Employment
 Within .002 1.2 –.001 0.5 .0004 0.6 .023 0.8
 Between .047 9.2 –.035 7.9 .005 3.1 .228 5.8
2 Employment (net of expected)
 Within .001 0.8 –.0003 0.1 .0001 0.8 .011 0.4
 Between .016 5.4 –.017 6.9 .005 5.4 .153 7.5
Private workplaces (per capita, log)
 Within .003 0.9 .007 3.4 .002 2.0 –.062 1.1
     Between   .006   0.3   –.003   0.2  .016   3.2   .958   8.4
Notes: 1  Each “within” regression includes year and municipality dummies, and standard errors are clustered by municipality. 
Each “between” regression includes the log of population and a dummy for the Stockholm region. Coeﬃcients for all these 
controls and regression summary statistics are not shown. Sample sizes vary according to the variables: total income, the SN 
survey, right-  wing seat share, and tax rates are available for most municipalities for 2001 to 2004. Employment, private work-
places, private contracts, and private-  household income shares are available for 2001 to 2003. There are 290 municipalities. 
2  Expected employment is computed as described in text. We have a similar but noisy measure for private employment. It is 
the expected employment in industries with mainly private employers (all one-  digit industries, except government, health, and 
education). For total employment, we deduct the log of expected employment from the log of actual employment. For the 
private-  employment share, we use our noisy measure of expected private employment to construct an expected private- 
employment share and deduct that from the actual private-  employment share. All employment data are for workplaces in the 
municipality. Thus, per capita employment can and does occasionally exceed 1.0. 3  household income from privately ﬁ  nanced 
wages and beneﬁ  ts/(private  public wages and beneﬁ  ts  public transfers). The denominator includes government transfers, as 
well as government wages and beneﬁ  ts.
aDependent variable in each regression is the indicated economic outcome. The political economy variable in each column is 
entered separately, except for regressions denoted (multi), where both indicated variables are entered
bEconomic outcomes under “total” are municipality totals divided by population. “Private-  sector shares” are the fraction of the 
total originating in the private sector. The “SN survey” is a standardized (0,1) variable that averages the standardized values of 
“unfair public competition” and “municipal bureaucracy and regulation” as described in table 8.3. Other variables are as de-
scribed in tables 8.1 through 8.3.
shares. Private- employment shares are unrelated to population (but higher around Stockholm). 
Private workplaces per capita are more numerous in the smaller municipalities (but there is no 
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that caveat.16 Accordingly, we try to emphasize the more-  or-  less consistent 
patterns in the data.
While individual results vary in strength, the broad pattern can be 
gleaned from the ﬁ  rst two columns of table 8.4. Municipalities that busi-
ness people perceive as friendly and that have lower tax rates tend to have 
higher incomes, which are generated in larger private sectors. That pattern 
shows up in both the short-  run (within) and long-  run (between) relation-
ships. The only wrinkle is the signiﬁ  cant positive within-  coeﬃcient of local 
tax rates, combined with the equally strong negative between-  eﬀect, in the 
total employment regressions. One inference is that public- sector expansion 
raises employment in the short run but reduces it in the long run.
Some of the magnitudes in the between- regressions are quite substantial. 
Consider, for example, the –  0.024 between-  coeﬃcient for local tax rates at 
the top of column (2). This is an estimate of the eﬀect of a / – 1 point move 
in the local tax rate on the log of per capita income. A 1- point move in local 
tax rates is around 3 percent, so the –  0.024 coeﬃcient implies that about 
three-  fourths of the potential revenue from a tax increase ultimately is lost 
because of erosion of the tax base.17 While this estimate of the reduction 
of the tax base may seem large, we would suggest that the result not be dis-
missed lightly. A reason for doubt would be that the tax rate is proxying for 
some force that makes intrinsically low-  income municipalities adopt high 
tax rates. If that is true for Sweden, it is certainly not generally true. For 
example, while we have not done the same simple between-  state exercise for 
the United States, we suspect it would show, if anything, results opposite to 
those we ﬁ  nd for Sweden: the high tax rate states in the United States (New 
York, California, Massachusetts) include some with the highest per capita 
incomes. It is not the case that low-  income Swedish municipalities need to 
have higher tax rates in order to provide the services they are mandated 
to oﬀer. A state redistribution scheme fully compensates municipalities for 
most structural causes (such as demography) of lower tax revenue or higher 
spending on services.
The between- tax coeﬃcients for the private- sector income and employment 
shares are even more startling. While some of the variables are not directly 
comparable, it is worth tracing through the implications of a 1-  point local 
16. We gave into the usual temptation to search for instruments. For example, we tried using 
the results of the 2002 municipal elections to instrument for some of the other policy variables. 
However, as table 8.3 suggests, the connection here is too weak for this kind of strategy to be 
useful.
17. For example, suppose a municipality with income of 100 now has a local tax rate of 31.32 
percent (the sample average of the municipality, plus county tax rate). So, it collects 31.32 in 
taxes. Now the municipality wants to raise revenue by 1.00, so it raises the tax rate to 32.32. 
However, the regression implies that a 1- point tax increase will reduce income by approximately 
0.024 percent. So ultimately, the tax base will decline from 100 to 97.60. The 32.32 percent tax 
on the 97.60 income will yield 31.54 in revenue, which is only 0.22 higher than the original 
revenue of 31.32. So, 0.78 of the potential revenue will be lost due to the erosion of the tax 
base following the tax increase.272        Stefan Fölster and Sam Peltzman
tax rate increase for the size of the private sector if the between-  coeﬃcients 
are causal: as mentioned, total income would fall 2.4 percent. Now read 
down column (2) to the –  0.032 between-  coeﬃcient for the private share of 
household income, and note from table 8.2 that this share averages just under 
half (0.49). So, the 1- point tax rate increase would reduce the private share to 
around 0.46. All in all, these results imply that private- sector- based incomes 
would fall by nearly three times the percentage increase in the tax rate.18 The 
same exercise for private employment yields a percentage decline that ranges 
from the same to twice the percentage tax rate increase.19
The between-  coeﬃcients in the SN survey also imply sizeable eﬀects. 
Again, the caveat about causality is in order (as is the counter-  implication 
of U.S. experience, where low-  income states and cities often adopt business 
friendly policies to attract businesses to their area). For example, the 0.022 
coeﬃcient near the top of column (1) suggests that per capita income will rise 
by 4.4 percent if a city moves from moderate hostility (1 standard deviation 
below the mean) to moderate friendship toward business (1 standard devia-
tion above the mean) on this survey.20 This may not sound like much, but 
18. Consider the municipality in the previous footnote that raises its tax rate by 1 point and 
thereby suﬀers a reduction in its tax base of 2.4 percent, from 100 to 97.60. According to table 
8.2, 49 percent of the average municipality’s household income is derived from the private 
sector. Though the tax base includes enterprise income as well as household income, we will 
assume for simplicity that 49 of the 100 of initial income came from the private sector, and the 
remaining 51 came from the government sector. After the tax increase, not only does the income 
decline to 97.60, but a smaller percentage also comes from the private sector. Speciﬁ  cally, the 
–  0.032 regression coeﬃcient in the private-  income share regression implies that the private-
 income share declines from 0.49 to 0.458. Thus, private- sector income will be 45.8 percent of the 
97.60 total income, or 44.70. This is almost 9 percent (8.78 percent) below the pretax increase 
private-  income level of 49. In sum, a tax increase of just over 3 percent ( 1/  31.32) reduces 
private-  sector incomes by a percentage almost three times as great.
19. The larger estimate is based on the – 0.035 between- coeﬃcient in column (2) in the private-
  employment share regression. The smaller estimate is based on the –  0.017 coeﬃcient in the 
regression immediately below that. We will illustrate the larger estimate by supposing that 
a municipality has 1,000 employees prior to a 1-  point increase in the local tax rate, from the 
sample average of 31.32 percent to 32.32 percent. Of these 1,000 workers, 620 work in the private 
sector (based on the sample average private-  sector share in table 8.2). The between-  coeﬃcient 
in the total employment regression (–  0.008) implies that the tax increase will reduce total 
employment by 0.8 percent to 992 workers. The –  0.035 coeﬃcient in the private-  employment 
share regression implies that the 1- point tax increase will reduce the private- sector employment 
share from 0.62 to 0.585. Accordingly, after the tax increase, 58.5 percent of the 992 workers, 
or 580 workers, will be employed in the private sector. This is 6.5 percent fewer private-  sector 
workers than the 620 who were employed prior to the tax increase. The 6.5 percentage reduction 
in private employment is around twice the percentage increase in the tax rate.
20. Note that the SN survey variable is scaled to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation 
of 1. So, the coeﬃcient of 0.022 measures the eﬀect of a 1-  standard-  deviation change in the 
survey score. The 2-  standard-  deviation move described here would therefore raise income by 
twice the coeﬃcient, or approximately 4.4 percent.
But the reader should not take the estimate literally. The coeﬃcient is measuring a variety of 
forces summarized in one variable—the SN survey. When we enter both the SN survey variable 
and the tax rate in the same between-  regression, the coeﬃcient of the survey declines around 
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in egalitarian Sweden, it is around a fourth to nearly a half of the standard 
deviation of per capita income across Swedish municipalities.21 The implica-
tions for the size of the private sector of the relevant between-  regressions 
are even more dramatic.22
The remaining political economy variables—private contracting and 
party shares in the municipal council—mostly echo the preceding results. 
Generally, higher aggregate incomes and greater private-  sector shares tend 
to be associated with municipalities that have more private contracting or 
that lean to the right politically. However, the eﬀects here tend to be mea-
sured a bit less precisely than the tax rate and SN survey eﬀects.23
The private workplace variable behaves diﬀerently than the other mea-
sures of the private sector. There is no robust evidence that business friendly 
policies are associated with more private businesses. Indeed, the short-  run 
(within) tax rate eﬀect is signiﬁ  cantly positive. Recall, however, that the num-
ber of private workplaces can increase, even if the private sector contracts 
in the aggregate. Thus, the results in column (2) of table 8.4 hint that new 
workplaces opening in the wake of a tax increase are smaller than average 
and make up for only part of the reduced activity at established workplaces. 
To some extent, this apparently odd stimulus to private workplaces from a 
tax increase may reﬂ  ect the greater ease with which small workplaces can 
evade taxes by operating partly in the shadow economy.
On the whole, we think the results in table 8.4 should encourage a broader 
investigation into the impact of local public policies on economic activity, in 
general, and on private- sector activity, in particular. Some of the individual 
results are weak, and we would reiterate caution about interpreting each 
result as a causal eﬀect of a particular policy. However, we would empha-
size the broad pattern in the data: municipalities that show up well on most 
any probusiness metric or that move in that direction also tend to have 
better-  performing local economies and larger private sectors. These results 
21. From table 8.2, note that the mean of the per capita income variable is around 150,000 
SEK, with a standard deviation of around 25, or 17 percent. So, 4.4 percent is around a fourth 
of this latter ﬁ  gure. Note, however, that the between-  regression includes controls for popula-
tion and Stockholm, which reduce the unexplained standard deviation to around 10 percent. 
Accordingly, a 4.4 percent income gain would be nearly half a standard deviation for average-
  sized municipalities, either within or outside the Stockholm region.
22. For example, if a municipality with income of 100 raises its survey score by 2 standard 
deviations, the between-  coeﬃcient in the total income regression (0.022) implies that total 
income will rise by twice the coeﬃcient, or 4.4 percent, to 104.40. Prior to the score improve-
ment, 49 of the 100 income was from the private sector (based on the 0.49 private-  sector share 
mean in table 8.2). According to the between- coeﬃcient in the private- income share regression 
(0.042), the private-  income share would rise from 0.49 to 0.532. Private income would then be 
53.2 percent of the 104.40 total, or 55.54. This is 13.3 percent more than the initial level of 49, 
or in percentage terms, three times as much as the increase in total income.
23. They also tend to be smaller numerically. For example, the results imply that only a small 
part of the eﬀects of raising the tax rate by 1 percentage point would be oﬀset by devoting all 
of the revenue to private-  sector contracts.274        Stefan Fölster and Sam Peltzman
for Sweden are similar to those found for the United States and India, where 
the probusiness metric in both cases concerned labor legislation.24
8.2.3      Long-  Term Growth and Local Public Policies
In tables 8.5 through 8.8, we look at the connection between local policies 
and growth rates rather than the level of local economic activity. Speciﬁ  cally, 
we ﬁ  rst ask how the policies that a municipality had in place in the early 
1990s are related to the municipality’s growth over the subsequent decade or 
so. We think the answer to that query reinforces the previous hints about the 
eﬀects of local policies. Then, we ask how policy changes within a municipal-
ity during the decade are related to growth within the period, and this adds 
still more weight to the preceding results.
We focus on the period from the early 1990s and forward rather than 
using an even longer period, because prior to the 1990s, municipalities were 
subject to a form of state subsidies that may have given rise to quite diﬀerent 
relations.25
We have only two measures of the local political economy available to 
us for the early 1990s. These are the local tax rate26 and the party distribu-
tion of seats resulting from the 1991 municipal election.27 Accordingly, the 
growth measures and policy indicators are summarized in table 8.5, and 
table 8.6 investigates whether growth in a municipality’s economy over the 
subsequent decade is related to these two indicators of the initial conditions 
in the political economy of the municipality.
Because of the decade-  long time frame, we drop the assumption implicit 
heretofore that population is exogenous, and we treat it as endogenous, along 
with other aggregates such as employment and income. Indeed, resource 
mobility over long periods suggests that much of the impact of one munici-
pality’s policies will show up in such aggregates rather than, say, in wage rates 
or in the size of the private sector. For example, a positive demand shock to 
the size of one municipality’s private sector may raise per capita wage and 
business incomes in the short run, but that will induce migration of resources 
24. Holmes (1998) found that U.S. counties (similar to Swedish municipalities) on the pro-
business side of a state border grew substantially faster than adjacent counties on the anti-
business side of the border. Besley and Burgess (2004) found that Indian states that amended 
their labor laws in a prolabor direction experienced subsequent decreases in (formal) economic 
activity compared to states that did not change their labor laws.
25. During the 1970s and 1980s, municipalities received state transfers as a share of their 
expenditure. This meant that municipalities that raised taxes received matching state funding 
and could increase their expenditure and employment by about twice the increase in tax rev-
enue. This was a main engine for the large increase in public-  sector employment in the period 
from 1970 to 1990. It also meant that municipalities that raised taxes faster may well have seen 
greater increases in employment during that period.
26. At that time, this included a small parish tax in addition to the municipal and county tax. 
The parish tax was eliminated in the mid-  1990s.
27. The next election occurred in 1994. When the initial year of any growth rate is 1994 or 
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to the municipality. The migration will expand aggregates such as employ-
ment and population while bringing per capita incomes back down. The tax 
base and hence tax revenues will also expand, oﬀsetting some of the eﬀects 
of the demand shock on the relative size of the private sector.
A long-  run adjustment process such as this seems consistent with the 
results in table 8.6, which reveals substantial eﬀects of the initial conditions 
on subsequent growth. The direction of these eﬀects is entirely consistent 
with the previous analysis of the ﬁ  rst few years of the new millennium, 
where the political climate in the early 1990s was friendlier to business (low 
taxes, high right- wing party seat shares) growth over the subsequent decade. 
This holds true for most every variable examined, including per capita and 
private-  sector share variables.28 But the largest eﬀects numerically, and the 
most reliable statistically, tend to show up, as expected, in the overall size of 
the local economy. The results are robust to controls for the expected growth 
of the local economy, for the Stockholm region, and for the initial size of 
the municipality.29
The magnitudes of some of the eﬀects implied by table 8.6 are surprisingly 
28. The only exception is the marginally signiﬁ  cant negative coeﬃcients of the right-  wing 
seat share in the private-  employment share regression.
29. Usually, adding the Stockholm region dummy results in a smaller estimated tax rate eﬀect. 
This reﬂ  ects the fact that the Stockholm region had lower initial tax rates and higher subsequent 
growth rates than the rest of Sweden. It is not clear to us that this average diﬀerence between 
the Stockholm region and the rest of Sweden should be treated as exogenous, which is implicitly 
what we are doing by adding the Stockholm area dummy to the regression.
Table 8.5  Growth rates and initial conditions: Swedish municipalities, 1993 to 2004, 
summary statistics
Growth rate variables   Mean  
Standard 
deviation   Unit
A. Size of the economy
  Population –0.30 0.78 % per year
  Employment 0.36 1.05 % per year
 Income  (individuals   enterprises) 3.88 1.03 % per year
  Income per capita 4.17 0.52 % per year
B. Private sector
  Employment share 0.603 0.508 parts of 100 per year
  Income share 0.474 0.273 parts of 100 per year
  Workplaces per capita 0.78 1.08 % per year
Initial conditions
  1993 local tax rate 31.66 1.22 % points
  1991 right-  wing party share   0.497   0.107   share
Note: Growth rates are measured over the decade 1993 or 1994 to 2003 or 2004, except work-
places for which initial year is 1997 and private share of household income for which initial 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Competition, Regulation, and the Role of Local Government Policies    2 7 7
(to a non-  Swede) large. Table 8.7 summarizes a few of these eﬀects by com-
paring growth in a hypothetical probusiness environment (right-  wing party 
shares above and tax rates below the sample averages by one standard devia-
tion) to growth in an antibusiness environment (vice versa). The aggregates 
(income, employment) grow over 1 percent per year faster in the probusiness 
municipality. While this may not sound like much, it is substantial relative to 
the growth rates Sweden has experienced over this period. It is the diﬀerence 
between declining employment and modestly growing employment. In terms 
of cumulative real income growth, the probusiness environment generates 80 
percent more growth by 2003 than the antibusiness environment.
The growth eﬀect is also large in the sense that it tends to corroborate the 
previous ﬁ  nding that higher tax rates may substantially erode a municipal-
ity’s tax base. The regressions in table 8.6 suggest that well over half of the 
potential tax revenues from any tax increase is ultimately lost through slower 
growth of the tax base. To see this, focus on aggregate income, which is the 
ultimate tax base for the local public sector.30 We will consider only the tax 
component of the policy- growth nexus (which, as indicated on line 6 of table 
8.7, is under half the total eﬀect of the counterfactual policy shift that the 
table analyzes.) So, imagine that in 1993, a municipality (with the national 
average party makeup of its municipal council) raised the local tax rate by 
1 point, from 31.66 percent (the sample average) to 32.66 percent. That 
should increase the municipality’s revenue by (1/  31.66), or 3.16 percent, if 
there is no erosion of the tax base. However, the tax coeﬃcient in table 8.6 
(–  0.213) suggests that income will grow 0.213 percent less per year than it 
would without the tax increase. By 2004, the smaller tax base engendered 
by this slower income growth would produce only 0.8 percent more revenue 
from the tax increase—not the 3.16 percent that might have been expected.31 
The slowdown of income growth after the tax increase is enough to oﬀset 
around three-  fourths of the potential revenue gain. This ﬁ  gure is quite con-
sistent with some of the larger estimates of the tax eﬀects in table 8.4. The 
two tables also tend to reinforce the view that higher tax rates are reducing 
30. The capital income component is not taxed locally, but growth in capital contributes to 
taxed income in the long run.
31. To see this, consider two municipalities, A and B, which are average in every respect, 
except that B raises taxes by 1 point in 1993, from the sample average of 31.66 percent to 32.66 
percent. Municipality A keeps its tax rate at 31.66 percent. Assume income is 100 in 1993 for 
both municipalities. So, both municipalities have 31.66 in local government revenue in 1993 
before B raises the tax rate. In the ensuing eleven years ending in 2004, income in A will grow 
at a nominal rate of 3.88 percent per year, or 2.58 percent per year in real terms (see table 8.5). 
Accordingly, real (1993 SEK) income in A will have increased from 100 to approximately 132.34 
( 1.025811 × 100). The unchanged tax rate of 31.66 percent would produce 41.90 of local tax 
revenues from the 132.34 in income in A in 2004.
Now we wish to estimate how much more than this benchmark of 41.90 in local taxes B 
will collect in 2004, a decade or so after having raised its tax rate by 1 point, or 3.16 percent, 
from 31.66 to 32.66 percent. The answer will be less than 3.16 percent more, because according 
to the regressions in table 8.7, B’s tax base will grow more slowly than A’s in the next eleven 
years. We will use the most conservative estimate of this eﬀect, which is the –  0.213 coeﬃcient 
on the last line of panel A.3 in table 8.7. This means that income in B will grow at a real rate 278        Stefan Fölster and Sam Peltzman
income rather than the other way around.32 That is, we see high taxes in the 
past, followed by low subsequent growth that eventually leads to the below-
  average income levels we found in the panel analysis.
We hesitate to do a similar counterfactual exercise for shifts in the makeup 
of the municipal council, because we think of that variable as a proxy for 
a whole set of policies that we cannot measure. Indeed, we would caution 
against too literal a reading of the tax increase counterfactual for the same 
reason.33
We also need to emphasize again the preliminary and suggestive character 
of the results. Public policies in Swedish municipalities tend to be highly 
persistent, even over long periods. Thus, a municipality with a high tax rate 
Table 8.7  Estimated impact of initial conditions on growth rates, Swedish municipalities, 1993 
to 2003
Annual growth rate or change in
Notes 













of income (pts 
of 100/year)
(4)
1 Probusiness 4.56 0.91 4.45 0.521
2 Average 3.88 0.36 4.17 0.474
3 Antibusiness 3.20 –0.19 3.90 0.427
4 Probusiness advantage (1 to 3) 1.36 1.10 0.55 .047
5   in standard deviation units 1.2 0.52 1.06 0.34
6     percent due to tax rate   38.2   25.5   42.2   28.6
Notes: All estimates are based on coeﬃcients of right-  wing party share and tax rates in regressions with 
controls for expected growth of employment (or the private share of employment), log of population, 
and the Stockholm region. 1  a municipality with a right-  wing municipality council seat share of 0.607 
(1 standard deviation above the average) and a local tax rate of 30.44 percent (1 standard deviation below 
average). 2  a municipality with a right-  wing municipality council seat share of 0.497 and a local tax 
rate of 31.66 percent, which are the sample averages. 3  a municipality with a right-  wing municipality 
council seat share of 0.393 (1 standard deviation below the average) and a local tax rate of 32.88 percent 
(1 standard deviation above average). 5  the probusiness advantage on line 4 divided by the standard 
deviation of the growth rate or change in the sample. 6  the part of the probusiness advantage on lines 
4 or 5 due to the diﬀerence in tax rates assumed for lines 1 and 3. The rest of the advantage comes from 
the assumed diﬀerence in right-  wing party seat shares.
of only 2.367 percent per year, or 0.213 percent per year less than A’s 2.58 percent growth rate. 
Thus, instead of the 132.34 tax base in A, municipality B’s 2004 income will be only 129.35 
( 1.0236711 × 100), which is 2.26 percent below A’s income. Municipality B’s tax rate of 32.66 
percent produces revenues of 42.25 on this 129.35 of income. This exceeds A’s tax revenues of 
41.90 by 0.35, or 0.84 percent. Thus, most of the potential revenue gain of 3.16 percent—more 
precisely, 73.4 percent of it ( (3.16–  0.84) /   3.16)—has not been realized by B because of the 
subsequent erosion of the tax base.
32. If it is income that is causing tax rates, the story linking tables 8.4 and 8.6 would have 
to be that municipalities with poor unobserved growth prospects for the future also have a 
high current demand for public spending. Then, we would see high taxes correlated with low 
subsequent growth and eventually lower-  than-  average income levels.
33. Municipal council party shares and tax rates in 1993 are related to subsequent policies 
that we can measure. For example, a regression of the average SN survey responses for 2001 to Competition, Regulation, and the Role of Local Government Policies    2 7 9
at the beginning of the 1990s very likely has a high tax rate now. Accordingly, 
the correlation between tax rates in 1993 and subsequent growth does not 
imply a causal link between the two.34 Had we regressed the same growth 
rate on 2004 tax rates, the same negative correlation would be observed, but 
neither would this imply a reverse causation—that the growth somehow led 
to high tax rates in 2004.
The persistence in growth rates and political economy variables at the 
municipality level raises a concern that the correlation between the two is 
driven by unobserved or unmeasured heterogeneity across municipalities. 
That is, something that we do not measure—call it the local culture for 
short—produces both high growth and business friendly policies. On this 
view, the persistence of both the policies and the growth would simply reﬂ  ect 
the durability of the local culture, but this would not imply that the policies 
produced the growth.35
One way to try to account for unobserved heterogeneity across munici-
palities is to treat it as a ﬁ  xed eﬀect and then to estimate the model from 
within-  period changes in each of the municipalities.36 We implement this 
in table 8.8, and as we will see, the results there enable us to rule out 
(unchanging) unobserved heterogeneity as the only reason for our pre-
vious results.
Another advantage of the ﬁ  xed eﬀects model is that it allows us to specify 
the growth process more precisely than we could in table 8.6. Speciﬁ  cally, 
think of growth in any aggregate, such as population, as the closing of a 
gap between some current long-  run equilibrium value (Y t ∗) and the actual 
value at the start of the period (Yt– 1); if the gap between the equilibrium and 
the starting actual values is positive, then growth is positive, for example.37 
2004 or the average private-  contract share of a municipality’s budget in 1997 to 2003 on right-
  wing seat share and tax rates for 1993 yields positive coeﬃcients for the former and negative 
coeﬃcients for the latter. The coeﬃcients are precisely estimated (t-  ratios in the 4 to 6 range) 
and quantitatively important.
34. One diﬃculty with exploring this causal link is that until 1991, municipalities that raised 
taxes receive generous matching funds from the state. Therefore, it may well be that higher taxes 
increased incomes before 1991 but decreased incomes after 1991. This distinction would be lost 
in panel regressions over longer periods.
35. Nor would it rule out such a causal link. A local culture that values growth may also 
enact policies that enable growth. A further diﬃculty is to disentangle measures that capture 
the overall demand for public spending from those that reﬂ  ect local preferences. For example, 
Torsten Persson informs us that adding the share of the population below age ﬁ  fteen and above 
age sixty-  ﬁ  ve as an explanatory variable to regressions like those in table 8.6 sometimes ren-
dered the estimated coeﬃcients for the tax rate nonsigniﬁ  cant. The motivation for adding these 
variables is that the young and old are primary consumers of local government goods (educa-
tion and health care). So, municipalities with many young or old people might be expected to 
have high taxes and possibly lower growth, simply because they have fewer people who work. 
However, this interpretation is not clear cut, because municipalities are fully compensated by 
state transfers for any demographic disadvantage. On the other side, if higher shares of the 
elderly and young increase the vote for spending programs, the extra variables may simply 
dilute the estimated tax eﬀect by introducing a determinant of the tax rate as an independent 
control variable.
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Speciﬁ  cally, ignoring an error term for a moment, the aggregate would 
change, according to
(1)  Yt  a(Yt ∗  Yt1),
where the delta is the change over the period, and a is an adjustment 
coeﬃcient, which generally should be less than one to allow for partial 
adjustment over arbitrary time periods, such as a calendar year. In our 
application, the municipality’s political economy aﬀects growth by chang-
ing the equilibrium or target values of some Y variable, such as population 
or employment. That is, suppose for simplicity that there is one index, X, 
that summarizes any municipality’s political economy and that it is related 
to the equilibrium Y in that municipality by
(2)  Y∗
it  hi  kXit,
where the i subscript denotes a speciﬁ  c municipality. Substituting equa-
tion (2) back into equation (1), multiplying through by the adjustment 
coeﬃcient, a, and adding an error term gives
(3)  Yit  ahi  akXit  aYi,t1  eit.
In this model, the error term includes a durable, municipality-  speciﬁ  c ﬁ  xed 
eﬀect (the otherwise unmeasured heterogeneity). We also allow for macro-
economic eﬀects on local growth with year ﬁ  xed eﬀects and add the usual 
mean-  zero error term. This gives an error term like
(4)  eit  vi  Tt  uit,
where the ﬁ  rst and second terms are the municipality and year ﬁ  xed eﬀects, 
respectively. The parameters we are interested in are in equation (3). If the 
model makes sense, the estimated adjustment coeﬃcient should be in the 
(–  1,0) interval, and we can recover the parameters of the equilibrium rela-
tion in equation (2) by dividing the coeﬃcient of X in equation (3) by the 
absolute value of the adjustment coeﬃcient.
Before discussing the estimates of the model in table 8.8, it is important 
to clarify how they can be compared to the results in table 8.6. Both sets of 
results describe the link between political economy and growth, but they 
answer diﬀerent questions. In table 8.6, we ask whether municipalities that 
have more business friendly policies grow faster than other municipalities. 
In table 8.8, we ask whether any municipality—business friendly or not—
experiences accelerated growth when it moves its policies in a more business 
friendly direction. The weight one chooses to give to each set of results 
involves a tradeoﬀ: in our data, the substantial bulk of the variance—on 
37. We couldn’t implement a model like this in table 8.6, because it would require the unten-
able assumption that every municipality, for example, is gravitating toward the same equilib-
rium population.282        Stefan Fölster and Sam Peltzman
the order of 90 percent of the total variance—in growth rates and political 
economy variables is cross-  sectional. Once the municipality and the time 
ﬁ  xed eﬀects are accounted for, there is relatively little year- to- year movement 
in either growth or policies. Thus, table 8.8 removes the possible unmea-
sured heterogeneity across municipalities, at the cost of leaving little varia-
tion left to be explained. Table 8.6 describes a much greater range of varia-
tion than table 8.8, possibly at the cost of a less-  clear interpretation of the 
estimates.
These caveats understood, the results in the two tables are broadly similar. 
For population and employment, both the right-  wing share and tax rate 
variables have the same signs and hint at similar magnitudes of eﬀects in 
the two tables.38 For income and income per capita, there are statistically 
or economically meaningful eﬀects from the right-  wing share variable in 
table 8.8 but none for the tax rate. This absence of a tax rate eﬀect on the 
income related measures in table 8.8 is the one clear diﬀerence between the 
two tables.
The other results in table 8.8 are sensible. The expected employment vari-
able—a municipality- speciﬁ  c measure of the eﬀect of national employment 
trends—always has the expected positive sign. The coeﬃcient of the lagged 
dependent variable—the adjustment coeﬃcient in equation (1)—always lies 
in the (–  1,0) interval implied by the model.
We think that the overall message coming from the results in tables 8.6 
and 8.8 tends to be mutually reinforcing: municipalities that either have 
or move toward business friendly policies tend to grow faster than they 
otherwise would. However, these results should be viewed as the beginning 
rather than the end of an important inquiry. We would again emphasize 
that the particular variables that we use to measure local policies in tables 
8.6 and 8.8—tax rates and municipal council politics—were selected based 
on data availability and should be regarded as proxies for a wider range of 
policies that aﬀect a municipality’s growth. The ﬁ  rst part of the empirical 
analysis tried to suggest what some of those policies might be. We hope that 
these results will stimulate further research into the connection between local 
policies and growth. For example, which speciﬁ  c policies are more or less 
important in stimulating growth? We think the answers to such questions 
38. For example, consider the 2.34 coeﬃcient on the right-  wing share variable in the third 
population regression in table 8.6. This means that a municipality with a 10- point above- average 
right-  wing share grew 0.234 percent faster per year over the eleven-  year sample period. That 
faster growth would compound into approximately a 2.6 percent higher population in 2004 
than it would otherwise. In table 8.8, the 0.256 equilibrium eﬀect of the same variable also 
implies a 2.6 percent higher population in the long run from a 10-  point shift to the right in the 
makeup of the municipal council.
For tax rates, the magnitudes implied by the two tables are also broadly similar. In table 8.6, 
the tax rate coeﬃcients for population and employment are – 0.122, which implies a compound 
reduction of 1.3 percent over the sample period. This is just about the same as the equilibrium 
eﬀect of the same change in tax rates on employment in table 8.8 (– 1.5 percent), but it is around 
2 percentage points less than the equilibrium eﬀect on population (–  3.5 percent) in table 8.8.Competition, Regulation, and the Role of Local Government Policies    2 8 3
might provide an important part of any progrowth strategy for Sweden as 
a whole.
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